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Liberty against Progress 
 
This is a pre-print version of the article and is not for citation.  The published version will be available 
at: https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/social-philosophy-and-policy 1 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The relationship between liberalism, liberty, and progress may at first appear to be an 
uncomplicated one.  Liberty, it is claimed, makes possible the innovation upon which 
progress and human advancement are built, and to the extent that we do not enjoy it, society 
is therefore all the more diminished.  Such a view, found in different guises in the work of 
Turgot and Condorcet, of J. S. Mill, and of Popper, forms one of the central grounds upon 
which defenses of liberty may be built.  In this essay I will claim that while helping us to 
understand why one may wish to affirm that liberty is required for progress, there are good 
reasons to initially question and ultimately reject this traditional view.  First, and if one 
adopts what I have called elsewhere an epistemic reading of liberalism, accepting that liberty 
is required for progress crucially depends upon whether one is considering progress in 
personal or social terms — that is, as a feature of our lives as individuals, or of the course of 
human history.2  With regard to the first, we will see that precisely because it explains why 
individuals should be permitted to respond to their circumstances as they see fit, liberty at 
best secures progress imperfectly.  The epistemic liberal standpoint is also significant with 
regard to liberty and human advancement more broadly construed.  Regardless of any doubt 
one may have about the consequences for personal progress of the exercise of liberty, there is 
an important sense in which we may question whether liberty should be defended on the 
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grounds of its connection to human advancement at all.  More specifically, if one accepts 
liberalism’s epistemic rather than ethical foundations, then regardless of what we do with our 
liberty, or of the judgments we make about its results for individuals, there is reason to 
believe that ethical judgments of its success or lack thereof at securing human progress are 
misplaced.3   
 To substantiate these claims my argument will be conducted as follows.  Subsequent 
to a discussion of the general features of the idea of progress, in Section II, I will outline the 
liberal account of the connection between it and liberty insofar as it may be construed, 
following J. S. Mill, in terms of both individual and social advancement.  Subsequent to this, 
in Section III I will look at the epistemic liberal justification of liberty as a response to what 
is called society’s knowledge problem.  Here liberty is valued because it secures complex 
adaptation to the totality of ever-changing circumstances with which no individual can be 
fully acquainted, but which are nonetheless relevant to the decisions that one may take to 
further personal progress.  Moreover, and understanding complex adaptation both as the 
adjustments made by individuals to their circumstances and as the overall results of those 
adjustments, I will consider whether the relationship between liberty and progress is as 
straightforward as liberals often suppose.  Here I will argue that economic progress, where 
personal setback is just as central as advances in standards of living and technological 
innovation, can be as costly as it is beneficial.  I will then consider the extent to which the 
underlying logic of the epistemic explanation of the costliness of economic progress is 
applicable to individual moral progress. I will argue that, precisely because it permits us to 
adhere to conservative conceptions of the good, one may have even less reason to be 
persuaded by the progress-based defense of liberty.  The second objective of this essay will 
be to employ the epistemic liberal standpoint to consider the nature of complex adaptation 
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insofar as it may undermine progress-based defenses of liberty with regard to general human 
advancement.  More specifically, in Section IV I will show that if liberty is justified insofar 
as it secures overall human progress, it does so at the risk of begging the question of how the 
relevant measure of progress may be identified in the necessary absence of full knowledge of 
the circumstances that would be relevant to doing so. 
 
II. PROGRESS, LIBERALISM, AND LIBERTY 
Before commencing our exploration of the relationship between liberty and progress, let us 
first consider the different understandings of the most general features of the notion of 
progress, four of which warrant particular attention for the purposes of the argument I will 
make here.  Similar to the broader notion of historical change of which it is just one example, 
the first feature of the notion of progress concerns what is held to advance.  Some, such as 
Condorcet, Saint-Simon, Comte, and Hayek conceive of progress in terms of the growth of 
human knowledge and in this respect are joined, with particular emphasis upon scientific 
knowledge, by Bacon, de Fontenelle, Popper, and Michael Polanyi.4  In contrast to these 
narrower epistemic conceptions, others such as Turgot view historical advancement as 
encompassing broader social and cultural development of which the growth of human 
knowledge is but one, albeit important, driver.5  The second feature of progress concerns its 
universality  where not only is the human condition held to improve over the course of 
history, but to do so according to identifiable laws that explain past advancement and predict 
future development to varying degrees.  Particularly notable examples of this universalist 
conception are Turgot’s two laws of development, Hegelian dialectic, and the historical 
materialism of Marx.6   
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 Two additional aspects of the notion of progress that are particularly significant for 
my argument are worth noting at the outset.  Thus, the third aspect of progress is premised 
upon the distinction between conceptions of even, or integral, progress and uneven progress.  
This distinction is concerned with the comprehensiveness, or lack thereof, of progress — that 
is, with the question of whether human advancement occurs across all spheres of social life at 
the same rate, or at different rates across different spheres.  It is in this respect that Marx, 
Saint-Simon, and Comte consider progress to be integral, while others, particularly earlier 
writers in France such as Turgot, Fontenelle, and Condorcet, accept that the march of 
progress may be uneven.7  The fourth aspect of progress that will be significant for my 
argument is the idea that conceptions of this notion typically assume an account of an ethico-
historical telos, or measure of the good, toward which or in virtue of which human efforts - 
what Hayek called “the process of civilization,”  - are said to move or may be retrospectively 
judged.8  Unsurprisingly, and along with the diversity of understandings above of what kind 
of process historical progress is, understandings of this telos vary from thinker to thinker, 
although all typically assume some or other account of human well-being, whether cashed 
out in terms of happiness, moral perfection, wealth, equality or some other master value or 
values.   
 Of course, whether progress is conceived as universal, integral, or in terms of an 
ethico-historical telos or against a measure of the good tells us little about the normative 
preconditions for its occurrence.  Indeed, progress may be considered in this sense to be 
serviceable to the defense of a variety of standpoints.  Notable early defenders of liberty as an 
essential precondition for progress were the Physiocrats, Turgot and Condorcet, each of 
whom sees human advancement as best secured by individual freedom, and later arguments 
in a similar vein can be identified in the work of liberals such as Mill, Popper, and 
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Polanyi.9By contrast, and far from being a precondition of progress, for Marx and Engels the 
liberal conception of freedom, particularly in its economic manifestation, is an obstacle to 
progress’s realization.10  Similarly, and equally ideologically distant from liberalism, an 
appeal to the notion of progress is evident in the thought of those for whom national or racial 
struggle, rather than liberty or class struggle, was the engine of human progress.  It is clear, 
therefore, that progress is, as Nisbet comments, “hydraheaded” and may mean  
the constant increase in knowledge, in free institutions, and in creativity, as it did to 
the Founding Fathers and their kindred spirits in England and France.  But it may also 
mean the relentless enhancement of the political state, the ever-more intrusive role of 
the state - and its military and police - into our individual lives, or the equally 
relentless ascent to domination of the world by a given race.11 
The importance of these nonliberal conceptions notwithstanding, it will largely not be my 
concern to approach the question of their relationship to progress.  Rather, I will be 
concerned solely with the question of liberty’s relationship to progress.  Among the earliest 
thinkers to connect liberty, and particularly economic liberty, to progress were the 
Physiocrats who, according to Bury, held that it “stimulates human efforts.”12  More 
specifically, writers such as Quesnay, Mirabeau, and Lemercier de la Rivière “believed in the 
future progress of society towards a state of happiness through the increase of opulence 
which would itself depend upon the growth of justice and ‘liberty’.”13  Moreover, for these 
earlier thinkers economic liberty serves an additional progressive purpose insofar as it leads 
to creativity and innovation, a point not lost on Marx for whom capitalism’s “[c]onstant 
revolutionizing of production” is a central if historically intermediate stage in humankind’s 
wider progressive unfolding.14   
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 Among subsequent writers the connection between liberty and progress is particularly 
evident in the work of Popper and J. S. Mill.15  Similar to the concerns of predecessors such 
as Bacon, de Fontenelle, Turgot, and Condorcet, Popper initially establishes the normative 
significance of this link in the particular case of the growth of scientific knowledge.  Central 
to Popper’s approach in this respect is the critical spirit in science, for it is in virtue of it that 
we may determine which theories ought to be discarded and which are best in terms of their 
explanatory and predictive power.  Popper’s view that the growth of scientific knowledge is a 
particular example of the growth of human knowledge more broadly construed links to his 
wider concerns in The Open Society and Its Enemies about the connection between liberty 
and progress.  In opposition to the stance of authoritarians, and just as the interests of 
progress in science are satisfied by employing the critical spirit to abandon theories that are 
false, so Popper holds that it should also be sustained in politics.  Here, Popper claims that 
this requires a society of a certain kind, an open society, where citizens enjoy the democratic 
right to scrutinize government policies so that the most undesirable among them may be 
modified and, if need be, politically falsified, or rejected.  It is upon similar grounds, 
moreover, that Popper defends liberty, including economic liberty, as it is through it that 
social problems can be solved and the unnecessary suffering that comes with authoritarian 
and totalitarian regimes avoided.16  Finally, Popper defends what he calls piecemeal social 
engineering rather than utopian planning on the grounds that it “permits repeated experiments 
and continuous readjustments” as part of a wider process of advancement.17   
 J. S. Mill’s discussion of progress and its preconditions is of particular significance 
insofar as it anticipates two core aspects of my argument.  The first concerns the kind of 
libertythat liberals defend and for whom such liberty is valuable.    In the first instance, Mill 
defends liberties of conscience and of expression, and with regard to the question of for 
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whom these are valuable claims that it is not just important that we exercise them as 
individuals to fulfill our nature as progressive beings.  The enjoyment of liberty of conscience 
and of expression by individuals, he adds, makes possible the truth testing that is vital for 
human advancement in a broader sense.  Secondly, and especially telling for the argument 
about liberty and progress that I will make, is Mill’s concern that we enjoy the liberty not just 
to express but to act upon our knowledge; an argument given expression when he famously 
discusses the idea of the liberal state securing our liberty to engage in “experiments of 
living.”18  Moreover, and as in the case of the argument for liberty of conscience and of 
expression, the two-pronged nature of Mill’s justification of experiments of living is evident 
when he claims that these are valuable not just because they secure one of the central 
elements of individual well-being, where “the mental and moral, like the muscular powers are 
improved only by being used.”19  The liberty to act upon our beliefs is a crucial element of 
processes of social learning and progress.  “As it is useful that while mankind are imperfect 
there should be different opinions,” he writes, “so is it that there should be different 
experiments of living; that free scope should be given to varieties of character, short of injury 
to others; and that the worth of different modes of life should be proved practically, when any 
one thinks fit to try them.”20  In the cases of both Mill and Popper, then, and to anticipate 
much of the substance of the argument to made later, a central element of the progress-based 
argument for liberty is the role it plays in facilitating both personal and social advancement 
via experimentation and adjustment.   
 
A. Individual progress and the creative destruction objection to liberty 
In the economic sphere the distinction between the individual and social benefits of liberty 
also opens the way for an important objection to the liberal case for it that we will presently 
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see shapes my argument.  Central here is the distinction between the impact of an agent’s 
own decisions upon his chances of personal progress or advancement and the impact the 
decisions of others have upon his chances.  In both cases there is good reason to claim that, 
with regard to the question of our personal interest in liberty as progressive beings, liberals 
do not appreciate the full implications of their own doctrine.  First, and precisely because the 
enjoyment of liberty means that we are legally sovereign in our decision-making with regard 
to resource use, there is no impediment to our choosing to remain faithful to antiquated 
production processes.  The case of restrictions upon the use of technology within Amish 
communities is an instructive one in this regard.21  The Amish, of course, are famous for 
choosing conservatively by exercising their economic liberty to refrain from using modern 
technologies such as automobiles and, with qualification, electricity.  Indeed, under a regime 
of liberty, it is at least logically possible that all could choose conservatively, thus adding 
further weight to the claim that liberty may be injurious to the prospects for human 
advancement, at least insofar as this is construed in terms of technological innovation and 
increases in material standards of living.   
 To be sure, even if it were possible for all to choose conservatively, it is highly 
unlikely that they would, and it is here where our chances of personal progress are impacted 
by the choices of others.  More specifically, under a regime of liberty it is often the case that 
the hands of those who would prefer to choose conservatively are forced in a progressive 
direction by the unintended results of the like exercise of liberty by the innovative and 
entrepreneurial.  The problem here is not so much that of the tempting presence of new 
technologies and production processes that innovation and entrepreneurial behavior make 
possible.  Depending upon the tenacity with which the conservative were to cling to his 
conception of the good, he could after all simply refrain from adopting them.  Rather, it is the 
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introduction of new technologies by others that render economically unviable those to which 
the conservative-minded would otherwise remain loyal — a phenomenon famously captured 
by Joseph Schumpeter’s notion of creative destruction — that provides reason to doubt the 
first objection to the liberal claim about progress.22  Here it becomes evident that, far from 
securing the possibility of successfully satisfying every economic preference, liberalism may 
be said instead to socialize choice insofar as it only secures the liberty of each to choose from 
within a range of options that is shaped in large part by the exercise of the liberty of all the 
rest.  To the detriment of the objection that liberty means that we can always choose 
conservatively, Schumpeter’s insight shows that even conservatives are often compelled, 
despite themselves, to choose progressively where the constellation of resources and 
production possibilities open to them is a function of the choices of others.  Of course, 
accepting this does not entirely vanquish the suspicions one may have about the liberal claim 
to economic progress, for there is good reason to stop short of viewing having one’s hands 
forced by the invisible hand of the market economy as evidence of personal advancement.  
Indeed, and as we shall explore in greater depth in the penultimate section of this essay, 
whether having one’s hand forced can be viewed as progressive depends not only upon the 
conception or measure of the good in virtue of which judgments of progress are made, but 
upon whether it is meaningful to view history in terms of progress at all.  For conservatives, 
and for those who do not view historical time as a progressive unfolding, the unintended 
consequences of the exercise of the economic liberty of others may with reason be viewed as 
ethically calamitous, a point to which we will return in Section III.   
 These considerations notwithstanding, there is another respect in which our 
Schumpeterian insight may lead us to doubt the progress-based argument for economic 
liberty.  Here it may be noted that, to the extent that they occur at all, long-run developments 
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in productive forces and the advances in living standards those developments stimulate are 
typically accompanied by cyclical downward adjustments in the form of recessions and, in 
extremis, depressions.  Contrary to the argument put forward by liberals, then, and recalling a 
distinction made by earlier thinkers such as Turgot and Condorcet, we may claim that overall 
progress under conditions of liberty is at best imperfect rather than perfect, or inexorable.  
We will return to this objection with regard to judgments about overall human advancement 
later on.  For now, however, it is worth pausing to consider the rôle that economic recessions 
and cyclical downturns play in the argument for liberty with regard to individual progress.  
Most tellingly, under circumstances where society’s productive forces become misaligned 
with the exigencies of underlying conditions, the exercise of economic liberty by some often 
damages the chances of progress of others, most notably when employers are compelled to 
lay off workers, or to reduce their consumption of the resources provided by their suppliers 
with all the negative effects this entails.  Indeed, precisely because recessions are not only 
permitted but are an essential aspect of the regime of economic liberty, economic liberty can 
on this view be held to be as inimical as it is conducive to our interests as progressive Millian 
beings.  The decentralized and disaggregated economic process that liberty facilities, that is, 
is at least in part constituted by often costly personal reversal in what may be called the 
unhappy creative-destructive disjunction between individual and overall progress.  In 
contrast, then, to the damage that creative-destruction does to the objection to the progress-
based argument for economic liberty, there is good reason to claim that it is strengthened by 
this phenomenon.  To be told that one’s personal misfortune at least contributed to a wider 
process of technological innovation and overall increases in material living standards would, 
after all, be of scant consolation to the randomly chosen unemployed progressive being.  Of 
course, and without failing to acknowledge the profound hardship and sense of personal 
dislocation that the experience of unemployment often brings, we may say that the force of 
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this objection is also diminished, at least to the extent that unemployment usually turns out to 
be a temporary setback relative to the full course of one’s working life.  It is at this juncture, 
therefore, where the distinction between costless and costly progress becomes significant.  
Rather, than being an example of how liberty is the enemy of individual progress, the creative 
destruction objection merely shows the argument that economic liberty secures the costless 
realization of individual progress to be false and that if it is the friend of individual progress 
at all, then liberty is progress’s friend at best contingently.23   
 
III. EPISTEMIC LIBERALISM, PROGRESS AND LIBERTY 
A. The knowledge problem and the necessity of liberty  
The considerations above give rise to two important questions.  First, is individual progress 
under liberty necessarily costly?  That is, is there something that may be identified about the 
exercise of liberty that shows that it must support individual progress only contingently?  
Second, and if so, does this deal a fatal blow to progress-based defenses of liberty advanced 
by liberals?  I noted earlier that a diversity of theorists, ranging from Bacon and Condorcet to 
Popper, advance what we may call epistemic progress-based defenses of liberty.  Here it is 
claimed that liberty is an essential precondition for progress insofar as it fosters the growth of 
knowledge, including scientific knowledge.  It is at this point, however, where we may 
introduce a different set of epistemic considerations that are significant for my argument in 
two respects.  First, these contrast with traditional epistemic progress-based defenses insofar 
as they emphasize the rôle that liberty plays, not as an essential precondition for the growth 
of knowledge but, rather, for its effective utilization. Second, in doing so they also allow us to 
claim not just that liberty is both a necessary precondition for progress and that the progress it 
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makes possible is necessarily imperfect and costly, but to explain why.  Central here is what 
has come to be called, following epistemic defenders of liberalism such as Friedrich Hayek, 
society’s economic knowledge problem, where the knowledge necessary for adequate 
decision-making about resource use is uncentralizable.  I have discussed the nature and 
significance of the economic knowledge problem at greater length elsewhere, but for now the 
following points are worth mentioning.24 The first reason for that the uncentralizability of 
this knowledge – of our needs and wants, and of the most appropriate means of satisfying 
them -  is that it is the subjective or personally held knowledge of individual economic agents 
about local and often temporary circumstances, including their own circumstances.  Most 
significantly, the knowledge relevant to the fruition of economic plans is not only unique to 
the individuals who possess it.  It is also knowledge possessed by individuals who in the 
overwhelming majority of instances are not directly connected to one another.  It exists, 
therefore, only “in the dispersed, incomplete, and inconsistent form in which it appears in 
many individual minds.”25  Finally, this knowledge is tacit in form and embodied in what we 
may call ethical dispositions and inherited traditions and practices.  “Though our civilization 
is the result of a cumulation of individual knowledge,” Hayek writes,  
it is not by their explicit or conscious combination of all this knowledge in any 
individual brain, but by its embodiment in symbols which we use without 
understanding them, in habits and institutions, tools and concepts, that man in society 
is constantly able to profit from a body of knowledge neither he nor any other man 
completely possesses.  Many of the greatest things man has achieved are the result not 
of consciously directed thought, and still less the product of a deliberately coordinated 
effort of many individuals, but of a process in which the individual plays a part which 
he can never fully understand.26   
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How, then, does the existence of an economic knowledge problem lend support to the 
case for economic liberty?  It is here where epistemic liberalism’s distinctive argument for 
liberty emerges, for if an adequate response to the knowledge problem is to be had then we 
need to secure significantly more than Millian liberty of thought, conscience, and expression, 
which Hayek also endorses.27  Responding to the knowledge problem, that is, not only 
requires the expression of our explicit propositional knowledge of facts about ourselves, 
others, and the world, as Plamenatz appears to suppose.28  As dispersed, fleeting, and often 
tacitly held, the knowledge relevant to the success of our economic plans is only 
communicated to each if all the rest enjoy the liberty to act upon it.  Similarly to Mill’s 
discussion of experiments of living in On Liberty, therefore, central to the epistemic liberal 
case is the extension of liberty from thought, conscience, and expression to action.   
 This commitment to liberty of action makes it possible to respond to the knowledge 
problem in two distinct although related ways.  First, the benefits of economic liberty and the 
private property rights it makes possible tie in directly with the epistemic function of market 
prices.  As Hayek’s example of the buying and selling of tin in “The Use of Knowledge in 
Society” makes clear, leaving individuals free to buy and sell rights to property from one 
another generates market prices which in turn serve to communicate information about 
factors that are relevant to the fruition of their plans, but which are known only to unseen 
distant others.29  It is, therefore, because of the prices emergent from our enjoyment of 
economic liberty that, despite our not being in a position to centrally direct efforts toward 
particular ends, including progressive ends, “[t]he whole acts as one market.”  It does so, 
moreover, “not because any of its members survey the whole field, but because their limited 
individual fields of vision sufficiently overlap so that through many intermediaries the 
relevant information is communicated to all.”30  Economic liberty produces, therefore, “an 
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adaptation to countless circumstances which in their totality are not known and cannot be 
known to any person or authority,” and which “cannot be brought about by a central direction 
of all economic activity.”31   
 Economic progress, of course, is but one aspect of the individual progress with which 
defenders of liberty may be concerned.  As Hayek makes clear in The Constitution of Liberty 
“it is very questionable whether there are any actions which can be called merely 
‘economic’” and the economic preferences that we do have only emerge as a result of our 
values and conceptions of the good.  “Economic considerations,” he continues, “are merely 
those by which we reconcile and adjust our different purposes, none of which, in the last 
resort, are economic.”32  In addition to the question of the connection between liberty and 
economic advancement, therefore, a similar question arises with respect to the institutional 
preconditions for cultural or moral and so it remains now to see whether the objection to 
liberalism’s progress-based argument for economic liberty can be sustained here.  One reason 
to reject the objection in the case of moral or cultural advancement, and to affirm the 
connection between liberty and progress, emerges from the underlying complex adaptive and 
creative-destructive logic of the process of civilization.  As I have argued elsewhere, just as it 
is marked by an economic knowledge problem, society is also marked by what we may call a 
cultural knowledge problem with respect to the selection of conceptions of the good out of 
which our economic preferences emerge.33  Here, and similar to the economic case, the 
knowledge that is relevant to the determination of questions of ethical value and of 
appropriate cultural practice is not only tacitly held in the form of the inherited traditions and 
cultural rules that motivate our action, but is also dispersed among us.  Most significantly for 
the question of the necessity of liberty, the important consequence of this cultural knowledge 
problem is that we are unable to make adequate centralized judgments about which 
NO
T F
OR
 C
ITA
TIO
N
 
 
 
 
conceptions of the good and constituent practices should persist in the interests of progress 
and which should be rejected.  We need, therefore, to conceive the problem of moral progress 
as not one of deciding which conception of the good is most appropriate in the light of our 
possession of all the ethical knowledge relevant to doing so, but of identifying the procedure 
in virtue of which that ethical knowledge may be coordinated under complex conditions so 
that such a conception may emerge.   
 It is here that the epistemic liberal standpoint lends itself to a defense of a stance of 
state permissiveness rather than restriction with respect to cultural practice, so that 
individuals may be at liberty not just to express but to act upon what they know and believe 
about the good life.34  Similarly to Hayek’s discussion of private property rights above, the 
reason why liberty is required in this respect is because it makes possible the communication 
of the ethical knowledge relevant to the determination of the value of particular conceptions 
of the good and their constituent practices.  Moreover, and just as the economic process is 
driven at the margins by entrepreneurs and innovators, so in the realm of culture and cultural 
value a similar phenomenon becomes apparent with respect to the activities of what I have 
called ethical trail-blazers; those individuals who either revise the circumstances in which 
they honor inherited rules and practices, or else reject and break them altogether and who are 
subsequently imitated by others, thus inducing an imitative ripple-effect of cultural change 
and transformation.35  On this reading, then, liberty makes possible what we may call a 
complex cultural adaptive process where, via the discrete choices of a multitude of only 
indirectly connected individuals who adhere to or renounce specific cultural practices, a 
wider process of value and practice arbitration is established.  Finally, and recalling Bury’s 
observation about progress and the possibility of the self-conscious direction of the social and 
economic process, it becomes apparent how, if neither knowledge problem were to exist, the 
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case for economic and cultural liberty would be redundant.  If we already knew all that we 
needed to know in order to make the decisions required to bring our plans to fruition there 
would be no need for the adjustment activity that liberty secures.   
 
B. Liberty and the necessary costliness of progress  
We turn now to the question of the implications our epistemic liberal reading of the 
preconditions for the pursuit of progress has for the progress-based defense of liberty.  Two 
of these in particular are worth scrutinizing.  The first is that the knowledge problem not only 
necessitates liberty but confirms the view that personal progress under liberty is, by necessity, 
occasionally costly.  The reason for this is that the knowledge problem is not a problem to 
which a once-and-for-all solution can be given, thus obviating the need for liberty.  Rather, it 
is a problem of our having to coordinate knowledge of complex circumstances that are 
themselves continuously transformed, not just because of occasional exogenous shocks, but 
precisely because of the endogenous impact of our ongoing exercise of liberty.  Hayek is 
helpfully clear about how, because of the very exercise of liberty in response to them, the 
circumstances to which individuals need to adapt continuously change, thus necessitating 
further adaptive responses.  “Every change in conditions,” he writes,   
will make necessary some change in the use of resources, in the direction and kind of 
human activities, in habits and practices.  And each change in the actions of those 
affected in the first instance will require further adjustments that will gradually extend 
throughout the whole of society.  Thus every change in a sense creates a “problem” 
for society; even though no single individual perceives it as such; and it is gradually 
“solved” by the establishment of a new over-all adjustment.  Those who take part in 
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the process have little idea why they are doing what they do, and we have no way of 
predicting who will at each step first make the appropriate move, or what particular 
combinations of knowledge and skill, personal attitudes and circumstances, will 
suggest to some man the suitable answer, or by what channels his example will be 
transmitted to others who will follow the lead.  It is difficult to conceive all the 
combinations of knowledge and skills which thus come into action and from which 
arises the discovery of appropriate practices or devices that, once found, can be 
accepted generally.  But from the countless number of humble steps taken by 
anonymous persons in the course of doing familiar things in changed circumstances 
spring the examples that prevail.  They are as important as major intellectual 
innovations which are explicitly recognized and communicated as such.36   
Most importantly, this insight into liberty and the ever-shifting nature of the knowledge 
problem also provides a deeper explanation than that provided by the creative destruction 
objection of why liberty must be costly.  Precisely because of the mutual distancing between 
individuals, it is not just the case that in exercising our liberty to respond to our 
circumstances we directly impact the chances of progress of others as the creative destruction 
objection makes evident.  Rather, it is also the case that economic decisions that agents make 
in response to their own circumstances induce ripple effects across the economy via the price 
mechanism that in turn impact the decisions of all the rest in ways that cannot be foreseen or 
controlled.  One may make an economic decision, for example, to foster progress, but in the 
absence of ever knowing what all the rest were doing under circumstances that only they 
were familiar with, and even if they too concerned with furthering progress, it could never be 
guaranteed that the decision would yield the desired result.  Indeed, when combined with the 
decisions of those others of which the actor knows nothing at all, it could turn out to be 
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entirely counterproductive to the stated objective.  Thus, even if each were motivated to 
exercise his or her economic liberty to secure progress for all the rest, and unlike the state of 
affairs in a small-scale community where concerted action in furtherance of collective ends is 
possible, the attempt to do so would be defeated by the insuperable obstacle that complexity 
presents to the direct coordination of decisions that would be required for success under ever-
changing conditions.37  If liberty drives personal progress at all, then, it must only ever do so 
imperfectly and often at great cost precisely because, when the circumstances suggest they 
should, it permits individuals to choose in ways that are both beneficial and harmful to the 
advancement of others.  Epistemic liberalism therefore vindicates the view that, while 
economic liberty is necessary to make an adequate response to the constraints imposed by the 
knowledge problem possible, the complex adaptation that it facilitates inevitably must also 
involve personal cost.   
 As we have seen, central to the idea of liberty is that individuals are left free to decide 
for themselves what kind of life they wish to lead, just as they are left free to decide upon the 
means that they will employ to lead it.  This insight brings us to the second implication of the 
epistemic view for progress-based defenses of liberty; that some may choose to maintain 
conservative if not reactionary lifestyles and practices, of which conservative religious 
revivals are instructive examples.  It is here, however, where an important difference between 
economic and cultural liberty becomes apparent.  Unlike the former, where it is relatively 
rare for obsolete production processes to be reemployed, this is not the case in the social 
domain.  Indeed, and as the reemergence of the practice of hijab amongst religious Muslim 
women shows, the whole point of a conservative religious revival is that it represents the 
readoption of a practice or cluster of practices once considered by many as retrograde or out-
of-date.  Rather, then, than confirming our finding with regard to economic liberty — that 
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progress under liberty is at best often costly to at least some — the example of conservative 
religious revivals issues in a stronger claim.  Precisely because they can be readopted in ways 
that old-fashioned production processes generally cannot, the example of conservative 
religious revivals shows in more unambiguous terms how liberty may be neither a necessary 
nor a sufficient condition for progress, costly or otherwise.  The exercise of liberty, that is, 
does not necessarily lead to inevitable, if at times costly, moral advancement of the kind 
presupposed by the Whig interpretation of history, and which does appear more evident in the 
economic domain.  As an example not of a pause in a process of progressive unfolding, but of 
a reversal of that process, the exercise of liberty may in fact lead to just the opposite.   
 Yet this is not the end of the matter, for we may claim that just as in the case of the 
conservative chooser in the economic sphere, under a regime of liberty the choices of cultural 
conservatives would for at least two reasons be constrained by those of their more liberal-
minded fellows.  First, individual choices regarding cultural practice are significantly 
constrained precisely by economic factors.  Refusing to work on particular days, in certain 
trades, with particular goods, or with particular kinds of people all serve to impose costs upon 
those who do so relative to those with a more liberal disposition.  Second, under a regime of 
liberty such pressure would also manifest itself beyond the economic domain.  Thus, even if 
they were legally permitted, the degree to which one could wear a burka or discriminate 
against those who did not conform to the moral dictates of one’s conception of the good 
would be limited to the degree to which others with whom one interacted approved of such 
practices.  Despite this, one could nevertheless claim that the hands of conservatives would 
be forced only in cases where they were less numerous than their liberal-minded fellows and 
where the impact of social sanction would therefore be more keenly felt.  In contrast to the 
case of conservative economic choosers, therefore, cultural advancement and the gradual 
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displacement of retrograde conceptions of the good and their associated practices occurs 
under a regime of liberty only to the extent to which the majority does not already choose 
progressively.  Luddites may over the long run always be victims of the innovation brought 
about by the choices of economic innovators and entrepreneurs, but this is not so in the 
cultural sphere.  Here advancement is contingent upon the degree to which those who enjoy 
liberty are already liberal and progressive.  It is clear, however, that even if conservatives 
were numerically superior to liberals, the advantage of the liberal-minded would still exist, 
insofar as their less-restrictive ethos would afford them greater opportunity to participate in 
the labor market.  Moreover, upon closer examination the counter-objection is not telling 
even in the case of practices that impose discriminatory burdens upon others.38  Even in cases 
where a retrograde discriminatory norm were locally prevalent, under conditions of liberty 
those who imposed it would over the long run lose out to more liberal-minded employers 
because of their self-limiting access to the talent pool.  Progress would therefore be secured, 
albeit at a slower rate than in the economic sphere owing to the stickiness of norms relative to 
production processes, a point that corroborates the traditional view about the unevenness 
rather than the comprehensiveness of progress under liberty.39  This difference 
notwithstanding, our epistemic conception gives us reason to arrive at similar conclusions 
with regard to individual progress in the economic and social or cultural spheres.  To the 
detriment of the naïvely rosy version of the progress-based argument typically put forward by 
liberals, personal progress under liberty may occur, but does so at considerable cost to some 
and quite possibly at a slower rate in one sphere than in the other.     
 There is, however, an additional problem that liberals face when seeking to justify 
liberty in terms of its conduciveness to personal moral progress that may lead us to refrain 
from conceding even this much.  As was suggested in the discussion of the unintended 
economic consequences that the exercise of the liberty of others has for conservative 
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economic choosers, whether or not one experiences liberty as beneficially progressive or 
ethically calamitous is dependent upon the conception of the good to which one subscribes.  
In order to sustain the claim that such consequences are uniformly progressive, therefore, 
liberals would first need to establish that a progressive “comprehensive” conception of the 
good of the kind often attributed to Mill is the appropriate yardstick of progress in virtue of 
which the results of liberty’s exercise may be judged.40  As we will see in the next section 
when discussing progress and the overall results of liberty, however, and regardless of any 
ethical objections one may have to it, there are strong epistemic reasons to doubt whether 
such a view is sustainable. 
 
C. Is the costliness of progress a uniquely liberal problem?   
Having utilized the epistemic liberal perspective to establish that personal progress under a 
regime of liberty is at best necessarily imperfect and costly, it remains to consider our second 
question of whether these deficiencies are uniquely liberal.  This question is important 
because if it can be shown that there is an alternative to liberalism and liberty that does not 
suffer from imperfection or costliness, we may have a reason not just to doubt liberalism’s 
progress-based argument for liberty but to reject it, and liberalism, altogether.  One such 
alternative, as Bury explains, would be socialism.  Here one could suppose that not only 
would the imperfection and costliness of progress under liberal freedom fail to arise, as all 
decisions aimed at securing it would be collectively taken, but that the need for further 
progress would disappear.  “If the millennium can be brought about at a stroke by a certain 
arrangement of society,” Bury notes in his discussion, “the goal of development is achieved; 
we shall have reached the term, and shall have only to live in and enjoy the ideal state - a 
menagerie of happy men.”41   
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 The socialist view, however, is mistaken and our epistemic liberal reading of liberty’s 
effects upon progress is again of great assistance in this respect.  The existence of the 
knowledge problem does not depend upon the kind of political arrangement under 
consideration.  Rather, it is a background circumstance in virtue of which all such 
arrangements need to be evaluated.  That is, as a problem that emerges due to the complexity 
of underlying social conditions, the imperfection and costliness of progress is not unique to 
liberalism, but is rather an unavoidable part of the human condition and exists regardless of 
the particular account of political association one may wish to endorse.  The reason for this is 
twofold and also tracks our distinction between progress understood as a property of 
individual lives and of the process of civilization more generally construed.  With regard to 
the first, and as Plamenatz argues, precisely because we would never have full access to the 
knowledge of the circumstances to which we would need to respond to secure progress for 
each individual — assuming that we have a settled view not only of what counts as progress, 
but that we should judge quality of life in ameliorative terms — even under socialism the 
sacrifice of the advancement of some for the progress of all, and with it the personal 
costliness of progress, would be unavoidable.42 Indeed, the significant difference between 
liberalism and socialism in this respect is not that such sacrifices must be made, but in how 
they are made. In contrast to what we have seen is the impersonal complex adaptive selection 
mechanism made possible by liberalism’s regime of liberty, where winners and losers turn 
out to be the unintended results of a multitude of discrete individual choices, in the case of 
socialism this would occur via a centralized and intentional feedback mechanism.43  
Similarly, it is far-fetched to assume that humanity’s moral advancement could be secured by 
what we may call the central planning of history, when the knowledge relevant to 
successfully coordinating human endeavors towards progressive ends is not only beyond our 
reach, but is undergoing constant complex adaptive transformation subsequent to our 
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responses as individuals to circumstances known only to ourselves and to those in our nearest 
circle.  The epistemic account therefore shows that the appropriate question is not whether 
progress’s imperfection and costliness give us reason to reject progress-based arguments for 
liberty advanced by liberals.  No theory of politics can secure perfect and costless progress 
and to suppose otherwise is to work from an untenable assumption.  Rather, the appropriate 
question is how imperfect and costly with respect to individual progress the process 
facilitated by the regime of liberty is relative to any other possible regime.  Given, however, 
that the extent to which liberty is permitted is the extent to which we may coordinate with 
one another in furtherance of progressive ends under ever-changing circumstances, there is a 
clear sense in which, despite the costliness of the complex adaptive process it makes possible, 
the progress that liberty secures is the best that we can hope for.44   
 
IV. LIBERTY, PROGRESS, AND TELEOLOGY 
I noted earlier in discussing the creative destruction objection to progress-based defenses of 
liberty that the account of well-being in virtue of which we may say that our lives progress is 
subject to contestation and that, for those with conceptions of the good that impose 
restrictions on the use of technology, economic innovation cannot be seen as progress to the 
extent that it undermines their ability to adhere to them.  Even, therefore, if there are 
powerful reasons for claiming that a regime of liberty is the best that can be hoped for with 
regard to personal progress, there still remains the question of whether it is in any case 
coherent to predicate progress of the overall results of a regime of liberty, or of the results of 
any other account of political association that seeks to secure it, and that progress is therefore 
a value upon which such an account  may be justified.  Thus far we have been led to the 
conclusion that this is a reasonable assumption in the case of personal progress.  After all, 
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one only has to ask an individual if they believe their own choices and those of others have 
lead to their personal advancement relative to their stated aims and objectives in order to 
confirm this.  Our epistemic approach, however, provides reason to doubt whether the same 
can be said with regard to overall progress, or what we may call human advancement.  Such a 
claim, of course, may be surprising.  In the first instance, and recalling our discussion of the 
connection between liberty and economic recessions, we saw that it is meaningful to 
predicate progress of the results of liberty, especially insofar as recessions may be understood 
as periodic society-wide complex adaptive setbacks along an otherwise upward trajectory.  
Similarly, we have seen that it is also reasonable to claim that the readoption of hitherto 
discredited cultural practices represents a temporary, if somewhat more sticky, regression 
within a wider trajectory of humanity’s moral advancement.  Thus, despite explaining the 
inevitability of economic and cultural setback, the complex adaptive effects of liberty do not 
show that one must reject liberalism’s progress-based argument altogether.   
 Yet, there is reason to doubt that recessions and periods of cultural revival can be 
justified by defenders of progress as but temporary setbacks on a wider trajectory of human 
advancement, at least insofar as this presupposes an ethico-historical telos, or  master value, 
in virtue of which such a justification may be made.  The reason why this is problematic is 
that judging the overall results of social cooperation in terms of such a telos begs the question 
that we have seen the knowledge problem poses.  Because the knowledge of the 
circumstances to which we would need to refer when deciding upon an appropriate telos is 
uncentralizable, we cannot authoritatively claim what humanity’s historical vocation should 
be, nor even if it has one.  Yet, in positing a telos with regard to the unfolding of human 
history, defenders of progress do just this.  That is, they substitute the assumption of our 
status as mutually isolated contributing agents to rather than all-knowing directors of the 
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process of civilization with one that holds that we have access to an Archimedean standpoint 
from which questions concerning history’s ultimate purpose, and whether or not it has been 
achieved, may be judged.  Thus, analogously to Hayek’s critique of the foundational 
assumptions of neoclassical economics, in grounding historical judgment upon a conception 
of progress, defenders of progress erroneously assume that the knowledge of the particular 
circumstances that drives the process of civilization has already been accounted for and that 
the results of that process may therefore be coherently evaluated.45  As we saw earlier, 
however, and just as Hayek points out in relation to his notion of economic liberty as a 
discovery procedure, the complex adaptive process made possible by liberty cannot be said to 
have any substantive purpose beyond that of the coordination of knowledge.46  Indeed, if it 
has any identifiable purpose at all, ‘progress consists in the discovery of the yet not known’ – 
a goal whose achievement could, by its very nature, never be confirmed.47  Just, then, as we 
cannot posit an ideal or optimal distributive outcome upon which to judge the performance of 
economic liberty because the knowledge of the particular circumstances relevant to 
identifying it is never given in a way that would make this possible, so we ought to reject its 
corollary with respect to liberty and the ultimate purpose of the process of civilization.   
 There are two important counter-objections that may be raised against this skepticism 
implicit view.  First, there is scope to make such overall judgments if we carefully distinguish 
between retrospective and prospective judgments of human progress.  Even if prospective 
judgments are fraught in the way epistemic liberalism suggests, this is not so in the case of 
retrospective judgments. It is possible, for example, to consider recessions and conservative 
cultural revivals as backward steps, not relative to an epistemically problematic ethico-
historical telos, but merely relative to the state of affairs that preceded them.  An economic 
downturn on this reading is seen as a diminishment precisely because of its negative impact 
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across key measurable economic indicators as they were before.  Similarly, a cultural 
regression is considered as such because of the curtailment of liberties that were more widely 
enjoyed previously.  Yet, a reason to reject this response can be found with reference to the 
debate about comprehensive accounts of liberalism.  Here progress-based defenses of the 
results of social cooperation and the temporary setbacks that they include must nevertheless 
implicitly appeal to ethically controversial claims that are in tension with liberalism’s 
commitment to neutrality between different conceptions of the good.  Such defenses, that is, 
beg the question not only of why one should view humanity’s historical vocation as an 
ameliorative one.  From the standpoint of at least some, this is to say the least a controversial 
understanding of our place in the historical order, with the example of remote and 
uncontacted tribes who do not view the unfolding of history in ameliorative terms but who 
feel no less diminished because of this, or in need of colonial improvement of the kind that 
Mill defended, being an instructive case in point.  Even if such an ameliorative understanding 
of the purpose of history were not controversial, an account is required to explain why the 
specific conception of the good to which retrospective defenses of progress would under such 
circumstances implicitly appeal should be considered universally valid.  Viewing a recession 
as a temporary setback on the path to prosperity, for instance, presupposes a materialist 
conception of improvement that first needs to be established.  Similarly, and as was 
suggested earlier, viewing a conservative religious revival as a retrograde development 
relative to some prior state is crucially dependent upon the conception of the good that one 
assumes.  Indeed, relative to a less pious state, such a revival would be seen by many as a 
step forwards for humanity as much as a step backward.  Unfortunately, space does not allow 
a proper assessment of the persuasiveness of this critique of liberal political morality.  This 
notwithstanding, and in view of what we have claimed about the epistemically inscrutable 
nature of the process of civilization, it remains the case that the retrospective judgment 
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response is also vulnerable to our critique.  In assuming an ideal ethical standard in virtue of 
which retrospective evaluation between two points in historical time can be made 
meaningful, it represents a standpoint that floats freely above history’s inscrutable trajectory 
in a way that is as inexplicable as it is allegedly effortless. 
 A final counter-objection is that epistemic liberals have simply misunderstood 
progress-based defenses of liberty.  It is not the case that they assume cognitivism with 
regard to the telos of history.  They could, for instance, hold a more modest and perhaps more 
compelling view: that claims about human progress and claims about temporary regress 
within trajectories of progress are meaningful as claims merely about our movement along 
some measure of the good.48  Yet, even if we concede this, it remains the case that we are 
confronted with the problem of the surety with which we may claim that the particular 
measure that we favor is the appropriate one, given that by its very nature the ethical 
knowledge relevant to identifying it always remains steadfastly unaccounted for.  The 
problem, then, with this more modest view is not that it too assumes a naïvely cognitivist 
stance towards moral value.  Skepticism about the ultimate purpose of the process of 
civilization does not exclude the possibility of an objectively-valid conception or measure of 
the good, and it could be true that a life lived autonomously is the best possible form of life 
(in which case liberal rejection of the failed neutrality argument mentioned above would be 
vindicated).  The problem, that is, is not one of neutrality, but of epistemology.  As 
contributors to, rather than all-knowing directors of, the process of civilization, claiming as 
much makes an unwarranted assumption about how we may come to know that the measure 
of the good we favor is the appropriate one, given that our knowledge of the multitude of 
particular circumstances that would corroborate such a view is never given to us in a way that 
would vindicate our judgment.  From our vantage point, such a conception cannot be 
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considered to be either the ethical telos of history, or the ideal measure of the good from 
which the overall results of the process of civilization may be judged.  To utilize a phrase by 
Erik Olin Wright in his discussion of social transformation, it is impossible to write ‘the 
history of the future’ from our necessarily bounded epistemic standpoint.49 
 In the absence of either possibility, all that can be said is that liberalism’s 
commitment to liberty is justified because it permits society more readily to adapt itself to the 
complex circumstances that are relevant to the fulfillment of the purposes of its members, 
regardless of which conception of the good emerges as a result of this, or whether it happens 
to correlate to a conception which comprehensive liberals would endorse.  Rather than its 
tendency to promote progress, then, and in line with its epistemic rôle, a more appropriate 
evaluative standpoint with regard to liberty’s overall results would therefore be that of the 
degree to which it secures complex adaptation relative to some other decision procedure.  
Accepting this, however, means rejecting the notion of progress as appropriately performing 
this evaluative rôle on behalf of liberty.    
 
V. CONCLUSION 
Epistemic approaches to liberalism give us strong reasons to doubt the connection between 
liberty and progress.  First, the knowledge problem that lies at the heart of this approach 
shows how liberty is at best required for the costly and uneven realization of progress 
understood as an individual interest.  Precisely because it leaves individuals free to make 
their own choices concerning both the conception of the good they wish to pursue and the 
means by which they pursue it, it is always possible that the exercise of liberty will be 
inimical to individual progress.  Finally, epistemic liberalism shows how positing a 
conception or measure of the good in virtue of which judgments about the progressiveness of 
NO
T F
OR
 C
ITA
TIO
N
 
 
 
 
the overall results of liberty’s exercise may be made is not just problematic, but impossible.  
In adopting such a conception as the appropriate standard for judgments of human progress 
under conditions of liberty, one erroneously assumes the possibility of full knowledge of the 
particular circumstances that would confirm our selection of that conception as appropriates.  
Rather than posit such a conception or measure of the good as the criterion upon which the 
results of liberty may be evaluated, and our commitment to it subsequently justified, liberty is 
better conceived as a necessary condition for the complex adaptation that is required by the 
fact of the knowledge problem.  Accepting as much, however, means giving up on progress 
as central to the defense of liberty. 
Political Economy, King’s College London   
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